The best way of selecting samples in algebraic attacks against block ciphers is not well explored and understood. We introduce a simple strategy for selecting the plaintexts and demonstrate its strength by breaking reducedround KATAN32, LBlock and SIMON. For each case, we present a practical attack on reduced-round version which outperforms previous attempts of algebraic cryptanalysis whose complexities were close to exhaustive search. The attack is based on the selection of samples using cube attack and ElimLin which was presented at FSE'12, and a new technique called Universal Proning. In the case of LBlock, we break 10 out of 32 rounds. In KATAN32, we break 78 out of 254 rounds. Unlike previous attempts which break smaller number of rounds, we do not guess any bit of the key and we only use structural properties of the cipher to be able to break a higher number of rounds with much lower complexity. We show that cube attacks owe their success to the same properties and therefore can be used as a heuristic for selecting the samples in an algebraic attack. The performance of ElimLin is further enhanced by the new Universal Proning technique, which allows to discover linear equations that are not found by ElimLin.
Introduction
Algebraic attacks are a very powerful method for breaking ciphers in low data complexity attacks. This scenario is the most usual in practice. Algebraic cryptanalysis has brought about several important results (see [3, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23] ). An algebraic attack can be divided into several steps: building a system of equations and finding the solution to the system using an appropriate algorithm. The methods for finding the solution are, however, not sufficiently adapted for algebraic cryptanalysis, which shed a skeptical light on the entire discipline. The attacks mostly report breaking several rounds of a target cipher, but fail to explore scalable strategies for improvements. In this paper, we start filling this gap.
One approach in algebraic cryptanalysis is building a system of linear equations in the key variables using extensive preprocessing, such as cube attacks [5, 23, 24, 26] . Another approach is building a system of multivariate quadratic equations, and solving the system using Gröbner basis computation (F4/F5, XL/mXL), see [1, 29, 30, 39, 40, 44] , using XSL algorithm, see [11, 12, 17, 37] , or converting the multivariate system into algebraic normal form and running SAT solvers such as in [43] . All these methods usually implement a common step called ElimLin [18] .
ElimLin is a simple algorithm which uses linear equations from the linear span of a system for elimination of variables by substitution. It works iteratively until no new linear equation can be found. Using this method we can, in some cases, linearize a large multivariate polynomial system. Since this technique is used as the first step by all advanced techniques, a proper understanding of ElimLin algorithm is crucial for further advances in algebraic cryptanalysis.
In this paper, we present evidence that the success of SAT solvers in algebraic attacks depends on the performance of ElimLin algorithm and we expect similar phenomena to occur in the case of F4 and mXL. We show that the selection of samples based on a cube attack on R round ciphers performs well when breaking R + rounds cipher for a small . We demonstrate this by breaking 10 rounds (out of 32) of LBlock [45] in Sect. 3.4 and 78 rounds of KATAN32 (out of 254) [22] without guessing any key bits in Sect. 5, while all previous approaches were guessing 32 resp. 45 bits of the key. Then in Sect. 7, we mount the attack against the cipher called SIMON. Therefore, the complexity of their attack is of order 2 32 T(SAT) resp. 2 45 T(SAT) where T(SAT) denotes the average time necessary to break KATAN32. We also note that unlike SAT solvers, whenever ElimLin with our extensions was successful to recover one key, it was successful to recover the key in all cases we tested. The running time of our attack was several hours for smaller sets of samples, and up to 10 days for the largest sets of samples. Finally, we introduce a technique called Universal Proning which allows to find additional linear equations of the system which are satisfied for a random key with high probability. The relation between algebraic methods has been extensively studied. ElimLin is a basic algorithm which is part of every algebraic tool. XSL is an ad hoc version of XL which was analyzed in [12] . The XL algorithm computes the Gröbner basis in a similar way as F4, but it performs additional unnecessary computations [4] . The mXL variant of XL [39] is equivalent to F4 [2] . The comparison between Gröb-ner basis computation and performance of SAT solver was shown in [27] . The complexity of SAT was further studied in [38] . The asymptotic estimates of the complexity of XL and Gröbner basis were given in [46] . The multivariate equations representing the cipher are difficult to solve in general. The most general solving technique is to find the Gröbner basis of the ideal generated by the system using algorithms such as F4. Using this technique, the degree of equations in the system is iteratively increased until the first fall appears [33, Section 4.6] , and the system is fully solved, when a socalled degree of regularity is reached [8, Definition 3] . This degree is usually high [7] , and therefore such computation is often infeasible due to memory requirements. The SAT solving techniques also do not perform very well for complicated systems. The XL algorithm is a variant of the F4 algorithm [2] and therefore suffers from the same problems. ElimLin algorithm can be seen as iterations of a Gauss elimination and a substitution. It does not increase the degree of the system in any intermediate step, and hence it finds no solution in many cases. We observe that the running time of all the techniques above depends on the selection of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
In this paper, we introduce a technique for the selection of samples which significantly improves the running time for selected ciphers. In Sect. 2, we recall ElimLin algorithm, and then in Sect. 3, we introduce our method for selecting samples in an algebraic attack and show its performance using reduced-round LBlock. In Sect. 4, we discuss implementation improvements of ElimLin, which allow to parallelize the attack and reduce memory requirements. We apply our optimized ElimLin and the cube selection of samples against KATAN32 in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we introduce a new technique called Universal Proning for recovering linear equations which cannot be found by ElimLin, but which are satisfied for a random key with high probability. We use this technique together with ElimLin to attack reduced-round KATAN32 which was previously analyzed in [34, 35, 42] . We compare our results to state-of-the-art algebraic attacks on KATAN32 and show that our technique of selecting samples and recovering hidden linear equations outperform previous results. The recent attack against KATAN32 in [42] achieves similar number of rounds as we do but the authors guess 45 statebits before running the SAT. Hence, the complexity of their attack is 2 45 T(SAT) which is comparable to a previous attack in [6] . In Sect. 7, we demonstrate the selection of samples against another cipher called SIMON. The results show improvement against selection of samples based on truncated differentials from [16] . In Sect. 8, we explain the impact of our selection strategy to other algebraic attacks and we conclude in Sect. 9.
We show the effectiveness of our approach on three wellknown ciphers as an example and provide an evidence to support the hypothesis that this would be the case for other ciphers as well. Our sample selection technique can also be used in attacks based on F4/mXL and SAT solvers. The tradeoff between increasing number of samples for ElimLin and increasing degree in F4/mXL still remains an open problem.
The ElimLin algorithm
The ElimLin algorithm is a very simple tool for solving systems of multivariate equations. It is based on iterations of a Gauss elimination and a substitution of variables by linear equations. It is used as a preprocessing tool in most computer algebra systems, e.g., F4/F5 algorithm, XL, or even in cryptominisat. Since this algorithm is a common base of all solvers, it is important to carefully investigate its properties and capabilities. We recall ElimLin algorithm in Algorithm 1, and we refer the reader to [18] for additional details. Later in the paper, we discuss a strategy to improve the running time of ElimLin when we consider many samples. It was already shown in [18] that increasing the number of samples helps to find the secret key using ElimLin. We now show that selecting the plaintexts carefully can significantly improve the performance of ElimLin and even outperforms state-ofthe-art attacks based on SAT solvers. Since ElimLin performs only substitution by linear terms, the degree of the system cannot increase. Therefore, ElimLin solves the system and recovers the secret key only in very special cases. ElimLin is performed as the first step of Gröbner basis computation and even some SAT solvers, such as cryptominisat, run ElimLin as a preprocessing. Therefore, we focus on the selection of plaintexts which allows ElimLin to solve the system or eliminate the highest possible number of variables. 
Algorithm 1: ElimLin

Selection of samples
In this section, we define our system of equations and give necessary definitions. In part 3.1, we give a new characterization of the system when ElimLin succeeds. In part 3.2, we find a strategy for selection of samples, which allows to satisfy this condition. This selection strategy is based on cube attacks which we recall in part 3.3. In part 3.4, we show the performance of such a technique on LBlock and compare our results to previous algebraic attacks based on ElimLin. In part 3.5, we give further insight into our method and directions for future testing and improvements. 
We use notation S χ,γ,κ to denote that we set plaintext to χ , ciphertext to γ and key to κ. The symbol at any position means that the value is unset. Hence, S χ, , is the system of equations when we fix the plaintexts to χ and S ,γ , is the system when we fix the ciphertexts to γ . We later use S χ,γ, which represents, thus, the system in which we fix both the plaintext and the ciphertext.
Notation 5
For a system 1 S, we denote: Equivalently, the plaintext is uniquely determined by the key κ and the ciphertext γ resp., and ciphertext is uniquely determined by the key κ and the plaintext χ . Similarly, we assume that χ and γ fully characterize the key κ:
Assumption 7
We assume that the ideal S χ,γ, is a maximal ideal.
We recall that smpn denotes the number of plaintextciphertext pairs. For the assumption to be satisfied, we require that smpn is large enough to uniquely characterize κ.
Definition 8 Given a set of variables W , we denote
The ideal Triv[V ] is an ideal of trivial relations which exist due to computation in function field.
We define the degree of mul-
Hence based on Definition 9, we consider degree of a polynomial to be the degree of the equivalent boolean polynomial, i.e, for q ∈ F 2 
In our experiments, the equations for KATAN32 are built as in [6] and the equations for LBlock as in [18] . This allows for more accurate comparison of our method of selection of samples. 1 We assume that our equations are sound in the sense being fully "Describing" equations [15] for each component of the encryption process.
Characterization of systems when ElimLin succeeds
We now explore the properties of systems for which ElimLin succeeds to recover the secret key. We use this characterization in Part 3.2 to derive a selection strategy for plaintexts. We now reformulate ElimLin (Algorithm 1) based on matrix operations. We consider matrices over
. . .
ElimLin performs Gauss elimination and substitution. Gauss elimination (step 6 of Algorithm 1) corresponds to matrix multiplication.
The substitution can be expressed as multiplication by a monomial. Let assume substitution of x 1 using linear polynomial
Assume that Eq 2 = x 1 p + q where x 1 does not appear in p and q. Let x 1 p be the substituted term. After substitution, we obtain (
Hence, the substitution of x 1 in Eq 2 can be expressed as matrix multiplication
We use associativity and express ElimLin (Q) by a single matrix multiplication, say E · Q.
Lemma 11
Consider a system S such that ElimLin applied to S χ,γ, recovers the key bit k j as value c j ∈ F 2 . Let E be the ElimLin transformation, i.e, one line of matrix E · S χ,γ, corresponds to equation k j +c j . Then, the same line of matrix E · S can be written as k j + c j + q and q χ,γ, = 0.
In the first case, we obtained k j + c j .
Hence in the second case, we have to obtain a polynomial q such that q χ,γ, = k j + c j . Let us consider a polynomial q = q χ,γ, +q . Then, q belongs to kernel of the homomorphism () χ,γ, , i.e, q χ,γ, = 0.
The polynomial q will be important in the selection strategy of plaintexts. The existence of such polynomial is essential for ElimLin to be able to recover the secret key. At the same time, the existence of such polynomial can be guaranteed if we select the samples based on a successful cube attack.
A Selection Strategy for Plaintexts in ElimLin
Lemma 11 characterizes the span of ElimLin when it recovers the value of the key k j . We now discuss the strategy to ensure that this condition is satisfied. We now consider the polynomial q from Lemma 11. Since we cannot choose simultaneously the plaintext and the ciphertext for a single sample, we consider several different scenarios: selecting only plaintexts, only ciphertexts, selecting partly plaintexts and partly ciphertexts. The selection of related plaintexts such that corresponding ciphertexts are also somehow related is left as open problem. Such pairs might be constructed using high-order and truncated differential cryptanalysis [36] . In our scenario, we concentrate on the selection of only plaintexts. We found no advantage in the selection of only ciphertexts. The selection of part of plaintexts and part of ciphertexts is yet to be explored. The selection of related plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts is specific to a chosen cipher. However, our goal is to determine an optimal generic selection of samples. We use Lemma 11 for the selection of plaintexts. It specifies the properties of q which has to evaluate to 0 when we set plaintext and ciphertext variables, i.e, when we set χ and γ . However, we would like to guarantee that q evaluates to 0 only when setting the plaintexts since we cannot control both the plaintexts and the ciphertexts. Hence, we are looking for a set of samples that lead to existence of such q when we set only plaintext variables. Let deg r ( p) denote the total degree of the polynomial p in variables corresponding to round r , i.e, s r 1,1 , . . . , s r smpn,sln . Provided the deg 0 (q ) < D, we can build a set of 2 D samples, i.e, find χ , such that q evaluates to 0. This leads us to setting values χ according to a cube recovered from cube attack.
Cube attack
The cube attack [24] can be seen as a tool to analyze a blackbox polynomial which we represent by f (x, k). The aim is to derive a set of equations which is easy to solve and which is satisfied for all keys, i.e, for all values of k. The attacker does this in the offline phase. Afterward, in the online phase, the attacker finds the evaluation for each equation and solves the system. We query this polynomial in an offline phase for both parameters x and k. In the online phase, we are allowed to use queries only in the first parameter x, since k is set to an unknown value κ. The objective is to recover this κ. To achieve this, we find a hidden structure of f (x, k) in the offline phase and use it to derive κ in the online phase.
In the offline phase, we find sets of plaintexts C i such that x∈C i f (x, k) behaves like a linear function i (k) and i 's are linearly independent. In the online phase, we ask the oracle for encryptions of plaintexts from C i and solve the system of linear equations. In the following, we derive the algebraic expression of x∈C i f (x, k) and show that this function can indeed behave like a function (k). Let f (x, k) be a black-box polynomial which can be for some coefficients
Definition 12
Let m, t ∈ {0, 1} sln such that t ∧ m = 0. We define C m,t = {x : x ∧m = t}. We call C m,t a "cube", m a "mask", and t a "template", and we denote I m = {i : Proof The proof can be found in the "Appendix".
The success of cube attacks is based on finding enough cubes C m i ,t i , i.e, enough m i s, t i s, such that
k j are linearly independent low degree equations. Even though cube attack may be a powerful tool in algebraic cryptanalysis, it has been successful against only very few ciphers. The reduced-round TRIVIUM [9] can be attacked for 784 and 799 rounds [31] and can be distinguished with 2 30 samples up to 885 rounds [5] . The full round TRIVIUM has 1152 rounds, which means that 70 % of the cipher can be broken by this simple algebraic technique. GRAIN128 [32] was broken using so-called dynamic cube attack in [23] . KATAN32 was attacked in [6] using so-called side-channel cube attack first introduced in [25] . While cube attacks celebrate success in only few cases, we show that they can be used for selection of samples in other algebraic attacks. 
Selection of plaintexts
In this section, we show that the selection of plaintexts based on the success of cube attack is a good strategy for satisfying the condition from Sect. 3.1. We give an attack against 10 rounds of LBlock. This attack outperforms the previous attempts of algebraic cryptanalysis [18] . We compare our strategy of using samples for cube attack to the strategy of selecting a random cube or a random set of samples. The strategy of selecting a random cube was previously explored in [28] . The authors were choosing correlated messages based on a algebraic high-order differential.
Breaking 8 rounds of
LBlock . The previous result on breaking 8 rounds of LBlock using ElimLin required 8 random plaintexts, and guessing 32 bits of the key (out of 80bits). We found that if we select 8 plaintexts based on cube C m,t for m=0x0000000000000007 t=0x0e84fa78338cd9fb0 , we break 8 rounds of LBlock without guessing any key bits. We verified this result for 100 random keys, and we were able to recover each of the 100 secret keys we tried using ElimLin.
Breaking 10 rounds of LBlock . We found that if we select 16 plaintexts based on cube C m,t for m=0x0000000000003600 t=0x0e84fa78338cd89b6 , we break 10 rounds of LBlock without guessing any key bits. We verified this result for 100 random keys. We were able to recover each of the 100 secret keys we tried using ElimLin. We tried to extend the attack to 11 rounds of LBlock; however, we have not found any cube of dimension 5 or 6 which would allow ElimLin to solve the system.
Random versus Non-Random Selection of Plaintexts.
We tested the performance of ElimLin applied to the 10-round LBlock for the same number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Our results show that when ElimLin algorithm is applied to a set of n plaintexts from a cube, the linear span it recovers is larger than for a set of n random samples. We also show that ElimLin behaves better on some cubes and that this behavior is invariant to affine transformation. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
ElimLin and cube attacks
In this section, we explain the intuition behind using a cube attack for selecting samples for ElimLin. We first elaborate on our observations about ElimLin's ability to recover the equation found by cube attack. Later, we compare our approach to classical cube attacks and give additional observations about behavior of ElimLin with our selection of samples.
Structure of the cube. Let E κ denote the encryption under the key κ, and let consider two samples for the plaintexts χ and χ + , where has a low Hamming weight. Many statebits in the first rounds of computation E κ (χ ) and E κ (χ + ) take the same value since they can be expressed by the same low degree polynomial in the key and state variables. This can be detected by ElimLin and used to reduce the total number of variables of the system. Therefore, good candidates for the selection of samples are plaintexts which are pairwise close to each other -in other words, plaintexts from a cube. Let now consider χ = χ p : χ p ∈ C m,t . We consider a black-box polynomial f (x, k) computing the value of state variable s j x,r for a key k, a plaintext x, a statebit j and r rounds. The cube attack gives an equa-
is found also by ElimLin in a majority of cases. We further found that ElimLin can find many pairs of indices (a, b), such that s j a,r equals to s j b,r . We assume that this is the fundamental reason for the success of cube attack. Thanks to such simple substitutions, ElimLin can break a higher number of rounds while decreasing the running time. ElimLin vs. Cube Attacks. The attack based on cube attack consists of an expensive offline phase, where we build the system of equations which is easy to solve, i.e, linear (or low degree) equations in the key bits, and the online phase where we find evaluations for these linear equations and solve the system. The attack based on ElimLin consists of a cheap offline phase, since the system of equations represents the encryption algorithm, and the online phase is therefore more expensive. Our attack can be seen as a mix of these two approaches. We increase the cost of the offline phase to find a good set of samples and run ElimLin on the system without the knowledge of ciphertext. Hence, we simplify the system for the online phase.
Comparison of number of attacked rounds by Cube Attacks and
ElimLin with same samples. In our attacks we observed an interesting phenomena which occurs for every cipher we tested. Our first phase consists of finding a cube attack against a R round ciphers. In the next phase, we consider R +r round cipher, build a system of equations, set plaintext bits correspondingly, and run ElimLin to obtain a system P. In the next step, we query the encryption oracle for ciphertexts, build a system of equations corresponding to rounds [R, R + r ], and run ElimLin to obtain a system C. We found that the success of ElimLin to recover the secret key of R + r round cipher strongly depends on the selection of plaintexts: random samples perform worse than random cubes and random cubes perform worse than the ones which perform well in cube attack. The plaintexts selected based on a cube allow ElimLin to find more linear relations, which are in many cases of form s j a,r = s j b,r . Hence, we obtain a system with significantly less variables. This allows us to recover the secret key. In the cases of LBlock and KATAN32, we obtained r ≈ R 3 . These observation suggest a further research in performance of ElimLin against ciphers such as TRIVIUM and GRAIN128, since there already exist cube attacks against a significant number of rounds [5, 23, 31] .
Optimizing ElimLin
An efficient implementation of ElimLin faces several challenges. For ElimLin to be successful, it is necessary to consider a lot of samples. However, a high number of samples leads to an increase in memory requirements. We remind the Theorem 13 from [18] and use the result to split the system into small subsystems corresponding to different plaintext samples and recover most linear equations with small memory requirements.
Definition 14
Let Q be the initial set for ElimLin. Let Q T , Q L be the resulting sets of ElimLin. We call the linear span of Q T ∪ Q L ElimLin span and denote
Theorem 15 (ElimLin invariant [18]) The span elspan (Q) is invariant with respect to the order of substitutions and Gauss elimination.
Algorithm
Since the result of ElimLin does not depend on the order of substitutions, we propose a divide and conquer strategy for handling a large amount of samples. We divide the system The analysis of intermediate outputs of ElimLin reveals that most linear equations are discovered already in the union of these small systems, i.e, in elspan S i ∪ S j . Since the running time and the memory requirements of ElimLin are proportional to the size of the system, we propose an additional tweak of the algorithm. In this tweak, we compute ElimLin for all pairs of subsystems, i.e, for elspan S i ∪ S j , and, before performing a merge in the inner node of the tree containing leaves [a, b], we also include all linear equations recovered by ElimLin on pairs of leaf nodes, i.e, i, j∈ [a,b] S i ∪ S j L . Therefore, for n the number of systems S i , we perform ElimLin n 2 -times more, but we substantially decrease the memory requirements of ElimLin in each node [a, b] . The graphical representation is given in Figure 1 .
In the next section, we show the performance of our new version of ElimLin algorithm and give examples of reducedround KATAN32 and sets of plaintexts that allow us to derive the key using ElimLin. All our attacks outperform the best known attacks, and they can be performed using a standard computer with sufficient RAM. In our case, the limitation was 40GB of RAM memory. We expect that our results can be improved both in terms of time, memory, and data. This requires better implementation of ElimLin and finding a better cube for selection of samples. Therefore we mainly concentrate on successes and failures of ElimLin to recover the secret key. Additionally, we use a method called Universal Proning which we describe in Sect. 6. This method allows to recover equations among state variables corresponding to different plaintexts which are valid for every key. These additional equations further speed up ElimLin and allow to break more rounds in some cases.
Selection of samples in KATAN32
We give results of the attack against KATAN32 in Table 3 . The previous best algebraic attack is given by Bard et al. [6] . The authors attack:
-79 rounds of KATAN32 using SAT solver, 20 chosen plaintexts and guessing 45 key bits. -71 and 75 rounds of KATAN32, and guessing 35-bits of the key.
In our attacks, we do not guess any key bit and achieve a comparable number of rounds. However, we need to use more plaintext-ciphertext pairs (128 − −1024 instead of 20). The main advantage of our attack is not only the fact that we do not need to guess the key bits but also its determinism. Since the success of other algebraic attacks such as SAT solvers and Gröbner basis depends on the performance of ElimLin, our results may be applied in these scenarios for improving the attacks. In Table 2 , we show that the selection of samples is important for KATAN32. The reader can observe that in the case of 69 rounds, the template of the cube is important for ElimLin to succeed. In the case when the template was selected based on cube attack for 55 rounds, the attack using ElimLin is successful to recover the key. However, when we use the same mask but a fixed template, ElimLin cannot recover any key bit. We can also see that when the number is maximal for this set of plaintexts: when we increase the number of rounds, ElimLin fails to recover the key. The reader should also note that the number of linear equations we recover for 70 round KATAN32 in the Universal Proning phase varies for different cubes. In the first case, we recover less linear equations by Universal Proning compared to 69 round case, because some linear equations were already recovered by ElimLin. In the second case, ElimLin was unable to recover the new equations appearing in the additional round, but they exist in the ideal, and therefore they can be found by the Universal Proning technique. The reader can also see that an increase in the number of samples allows to break more rounds in some cases. In the case of 71 rounds, we extend the mask of the cube by one bit, and in one case we can recover the key using ElimLin. In the other case, we cannot. In the case of 76 rounds, we were unable to break the system for any cube attack for 55 rounds. However, we found a cube attack of 59 rounds, which allowed ElimLin to solve the system for 76 round KATAN32 and 256 samples. In Table 3 , we give successful results of attack by ElimLin applied on reduced-round KATAN32 for various number of rounds. Hence, our selection of samples improves state-of-the-art attacks ok KATAN32. We attack 78 rounds of KATAN32 with 1024 samples without guessing any key bit (this corresponds to 79 rounds and guessing two key bits) with running time of 9 days, while in [6] , the authors need to guess 45 key bits to achieve complexity which is close to brute force.
Universal Proning
In this section, we explain how we can recover linear polynomials which are not found by ElimLin and how we can recover those that are recovered faster. We observe that most linear equations (polynomials of degree 1 over F 2 [V ]) which ElimLin recovers are satisfied independently of the secret key, these are the linear equations in elspan S χ, , and elspan S ,γ , . Therefore we introduce a new method called Universal Proning for finding all linear equations which are satisfied independently of the value of the key. In this section, we introduce universal polynomials. A universal polynomial is a polynomial f ∈ F 2 [V ], such that f ∈ S χ, ,κ or f ∈ S ,γ ,κ for every key κ, hence, the name universal. Intuitively, we can see that a universal polynomial cannot help to recover the secret key.
Universal Proning: Motivation
We demonstrate the method in Table 4 on recovering an algebraic expression of an S-box which is defined by a nonlinear cycle (07532461). The S-box satisfies the following equations. For an input (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) and output (y 2 , y 1 ,
These can be derived as follows. We consider input and output bits x i and y j which are represented by the first 6 rows, and additionally, we consider monomials among input bits x i . We build the matrix M as shown in Table 4 , and we find kernel of the matrix M. 
Hence, the ANF of an S-box can be recovered by computing the nullspace of matrix like in Table 4 . The Universal Proning Technique in Sect. 6.2 aims to recover the ANF of the encryption and the decryption functions using the same approach.
Universal Proning: Definitions
We now give definitions which allow to extend the previous method to recover ANF of an S-box. In what follows, we consider an extension to a deterministic cipher. In the case of recovering ANF for S-box, we were not sufficiently formal. We now fill this gap for Universal Proning. Informally, universal polynomials are polynomials of the ring F 2 [W ] which are "satisfied" for all values of the secret key. We consider a fixed set of plaintexts χ and a fixed set of ciphertexts γ = E κ (χ ) where κ is the unknown secret key. Now we aim to find universal polynomials in variables W . We consider a polynomial ring F 2 [W ] . Then for each polynomial, we consider the corresponding boolean function from the vector space Func F kln 2 , F 2 . Such function is obtained through 
the mapping e χ , d γ or f χ,γ as defined in Definition 17. Then using Theorem 20, we obtain that universal polynomials correspond to the zero function from the set Func F kln 2 , F 2 . Hence, we will recover universal polynomials from the kernel of mapping f χ,γ . When we set both plaintext and ciphertext, we have to distinguish variables which are computed by the encryption process and by the decryption process. Hence, we introduce a duplicate set of variables Dup (V ) in Definition 16.
Definition 16
Let V be a set of variables such that V ∩ V = {k 1 , . . . , k kln } and |V | = |V |. Let us consider a bijective function Dup : V → V where Dup (k) = k for each k ∈ {k 1 , . . . , k kln } which is homomorphically extended from
Definition 17 Let us define the mapping e
such that e χ (m) maps κ in F kln 2 to the reduction of the polynomial m modulo 2 S χ, ,κ . We further denote for K ⊆ F kln 2 the mapping e χ | K :
2 to the reduction of the polynomial m modulo Dup S ,γ ,κ and we denote
2 to the reduction of the polynomial m modulo the ideal
2 since S χ, ,κ is a maximal ideal the reduction modulo it is in F 2 . Equivalently, the ideal reduction is equivalent to the evaluation of the polynomial.
We select a random subset K ⊆ F kln 2 and recover universal polynomials as ker e χ K and ker d γ K . The concept of universal polynomials is closely related to concepts earlier studied in [19, 
We say q is universal iff q ∈ B χ,γ . Otherwise, we say q is nonuniversal. For K ⊆ F kln 2 , we define
and we say B K χ,γ is consistent iff for κ ∈ F kln 2 such that
The idea for duplication of variables and building a system such as B χ,γ was independently developed in [41] . Due to Theorem 20, we can compute B χ,γ resp. B K χ,γ as ker f χ,γ resp. ker f χ,γ | K . That is, similar to the approach in Table 4 , we build a matrix M(V, K) where the rows represent a variable v ∈ V (each corresponds to some plaintext) and the columns represent a key k ∈ K (the input). The element (i, j) of the matrix is the value of variable (state bit) i for the key j. Afterward, we find the nullspace of the matrix M. The vectors in the nullspace represent linear equations which hold among the state bits for selected keys.
ElimLin and Universal Proning
In this section, we reconsider the algorithm from Sect. 4.1. We consider a split of the system S χ,γ, into S χ, , and S ,γ , , and we compute elspan S χ, , and elspan S ,γ , using Universal Proning. We can find hidden linear equations of system S χ, , , respectively, S ,γ , using ElimLin. However, we can also compute these equations using Universal Proning. Actually, we have elspan S χ, , ⊆ ker e χ and Dup elspan S ,γ , ⊆ ker d γ .
We perform these two computations together by computing ker f χ,γ . Then, we perform the back substitution and we obtain
Due to Theorem 20, we have B χ,γ V = S χ,γ, , and hence, we can use equations from the set B χ,γ V to speed up ElimLin. Furthermore, we reduce the computational complexity of finding ker f χ,γ as follows. We consider K ⊆ F kln 2 such that |K| |V |. Then, we want to compute ker f χ,γ | K = B K χ,γ and obtain new linear equations in the set B K χ,γ V . However, this straightforward approach is not possible; actually, it is easy to show that 1 ∈ B K χ,γ V , i.e, every secret key would be a solution.
Hence, we restrict the ideal B K χ,γ to vector space of polynomials of degree at most 1 and denote this B K χ,γ 1 . Then, we select a set of random keys K such that |K| |V |. This ensures that with a high probability, we have
. At the same time, the computation of
by computation of a kernel of an appropriate matrix is actually less expensive than ElimLin. In case of 71-round KATAN32 and a cube of 64 samples, the Universal Proning required approximately 350s while the ElimLin required 600s. We tried such attack with cube selection of samples when ElimLin itself was unable to recover the secret key. We run
and in 60 % of cases, we could recover the secret key.
Selection of samples in SIMON
We deploy an offline phase of cube attack against 10-and 11-round SIMON to select plaintext-ciphertext pairs used to build a polynomial system of 13-round SIMON which is afterward solved by ElimLin. We rank the results from offline phase of cube attack as follows. In Sect. 3.3, we reviewed the cube attacks as an attack against a black-box polynomial f (x, k). In the case of n-bit block ciphers, we can consider up to n different black-box polynomial for each round. We study SIMON with n = 32 and m = 4. Hence, we consider up to 64 different black-box polynomials, and we rank the cube C by the number of black-box polynomials f for which the cubesum is linear for the cube C.
In our experiment, we fixed a secret key and considered 10-round cubes of ranks 3 and 4. Then, we build the polynomial system and run ElimLin. Tables 5 and 6 show how many polynomials in the key variables were recovered for each cube.
Limitations of cube selection
In the next step, we found 20 cubes of 2 21 plaintexts of rank 1. We give these cubes in Table 7 . Since our implementation of ElimLin is not suitable for systems of 2 21 plaintextciphertext pairs, we selected subcubes of 2 5 and test the performance of ElimLin against 13 rounds as in Sect. 5. Even though these subcubes had rank 64, we did not recover any polynomial in key variables. This phenomena is still an open problem.
Final remarks on ElimLin
On increasing the degree in F4 and increasing the number of samples in ElimLin. 
The F4/mXL keeps increasing the degree until the solution is found in the linear span. ElimLin, on the other hand, requires more plaintext-ciphertext pairs to recover the key. We show that a better selection strategy improves the success of ElimLin, but the question whether the cipher can be broken for a large enough set of well-selected samples remains opened. Similarly, we can consider the increase in the number of samples as an alternative to linearization step of F4/mXL. The open problem is whether these strategies are equivalent or if one or the other performs better. However, we believe there is an advantage of considering multiple samples and using a method introduced in Sect. 6 over increasing the degree and linearization.
Implications for F4/mXL/SAT solvers Table 2 shows that selection of samples influences the degree of regularity of the system. This claim is based on the fact that for some choices of samples (choices of cubes m, t) 
ElimLin can solve the system. Therefore, the degree of regularity is at most 2, while for other choices it cannot recover the secret key, and hence the degree of regularity is in these cases greater than 2. We compare several strategies for selection of 16 samples for attacking 10-round LBlock. In the first case, we select the samples based on a cube attack of 6 rounds. Then, we run ElimLin which successfully recovers a secret key only for subset of these cubes. Subsequently, whenever ElimLin succeeds to recover the secret key for a cube, we perform additional tests with 100 random secret keys and were able to recover the secret key in all cases. In the second case, we select samples based on a random cube and obtain a system of 700 variables after ElimLin. In the third case, we select samples randomly and obtain a system of 2000 variables after ElimLin. This example shows the importance of selection of samples. The running time of F4/mXL is proportional to the degree of regularity and the number of variables in the system, and therefore, the proper selection of samples is a crucial step. In the case of SAT solvers, the running time depends on the number of restarts performed by the solver and the number of restarts depends on the number of high degree relations.
Conclusion
We showed that the offline phase of the cube attack can be used for the selection of samples in other algebraic techniques and that such selection significantly outperforms the random selection of samples. We used this method against reduced-round KATAN32 and showed that 78 rounds can be broken only using ElimLin and cube of 2 10 samples. The approach can be seen as a method of turning a single cube from cube attack into a key recovery technique. Our results highlight several open problems. The strategy of selecting more samples can be seen as an alternative to increasing the degree as it is done by F4/mXL. Using more samples leads to more variables in the system, yet the same goal is achieved by increasing the degree and linearization. Hence, the comparison of our selection of samples for ElimLin and state-of-the-art implementations of XL such as [10, 39] is crucial for future directions for algebraic cryptanalysis. During our work, we have discovered the existence of exploitable internal low degree relations inside openended systems of equations which depend on the plaintext and depend neither on the ciphertext nor on the key [19, slide118]. These additional equations are not always found by ElimLin, and we show that our attacks can be enhanced by finding such equations first, which process we call Universal Proning. The fact is that the solution is usually found in elspan S χ, , + elspan S ,γ , and the full analysis of Extended Proning is a part of an ongoing research. 
